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What To Do

when
Employers
Discriminate Against Unions
(Part 1)
Florian Bartosic
Roger C. Hartley
An employer's good faith mistake is no defense to liability
if the employee's organizing activity falls within the protective zone of the National Labor Relations Act.

S

gard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organiza-

ECTION
158(a)(3) OF THE
Labor Relations
Act National
("Act")
makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer "by discrimination in reEDITOR'S NOTE:

This article is derived from a chapter in the authors' book,

LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

1986).
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(ALI-ABA, Philadelphia, 2d ed.
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tion." (Unless otherwise indicated, all
section references will be to the Act as
codified in 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq.)
Provisos to section 158(a)(3) permit
an employer to enter into a union
shop agreement with the union and
thereby to discriminate against an employee who will not pay periodic
union dues and initiation fees. Section
158(b)(2) of the Code is a corollary to
section 158(a)(3). It prohibits unions
from causing or attempting to cause
an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of section
158(a)(3).
It is essential to distinguish the elements of a section 158(a)(3) violation

from those constituting a section
158(a)(1) violation. Section 158(a)(1)

protects the exercise of section 157
rights - engaging in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection even if no union is involved. Generally, in cases involving section. 158(a)(1), employer motivation is irrelevant. If, for example, an employer
knows that an employee has engaged

in protected activity and mistakenly,
but in good faith, believes that the
employee has been guilty of misconduct justifying discharge, such as
threatening to dynamite company
premises, it is nonetheless unlawful
under section 158(a)(1) for the employer to fire the employee because of
the alleged misconduct. NLRB v.
Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21
(1964). The Court in Burnup & Sims
reasoned that:
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9 Protected activity would have precarious status if innocent employees
engaging in it could be discharged;
e Their discharge on false charges,
even in good faith, could have a deterrent effect on other employees; and
* "It is the tendency of those discharges to weaken or destroy the section 158(a)(1) right that is controlling." Id. at 23-24.
The normal order of proof is that
the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board")
first shows that at the time of discharge the employee was engaged in
protected activity and the employer
knew it. The burden then shifts to the
employer to show an "honest belief"
the employee engaged in misconduct
and, for that reason, was discharged.
The burden then shifts to the General
Counsel to show the employee did not
engage in the conduct alleged or that
it was protected. Gen. Tel. Co., 251
N.L.R.B. 737 (1980), aff'd, 109
LRRM 2360 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
In contrast, section 158(a)(3) has a
different reach: Proof of violation requires a showing of both discrimination and encouragement or discouragement of union membership. The
relationship of these elements was
succinctly stated in Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43
(1954). Section 158(a)(3) "does not
outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accom-
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plished by discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in employment as such;
only such discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in a
labor organization is proscribed."
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employees engaged in concerted activities protected by section 157. This
motive limitation in the section 158(a)(3) concept of "discrimination" is
often referred to as adverse action
based in whole or in part on antiunion
animus. The Supreme Court, more
E NCOURAGING OR DISCOURAGING precisely defining the motive element,
UNION MEMBERSHIP e Fundahas adopted the Board's articulation:
mental to understanding section A finding of discrimination requires
158(a)(3) is understanding its concept proof that "the employee's protected
of discrimination. See Teamsters Lo- conduct was a substantial or motivatcal 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 ing factor in the adverse action."
(1961) (section 158(a)(3) violation re- NLRB v. Transp.Management Corp.,
quires existence of "the kind of dis- 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
crimination to which the Act is addressed"). First, section 158(a)(3) Intending the
discrimination is not limited to dis- ForeseeableConsequences
As noted, "only such discriminaparate treatment but includes the
broader concept of adverse action tion as encourages or discourages
taken against one or more employees. membership in a labor organization is
See Midstate Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 706 proscribed." Radio Officers' Union v.
E2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1983). Second, NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954). The
the adverse action contemplated in- Supreme Court has explained that
cludes not only hiring and layoff deci- discouraging "'membership in [a] lasions and the normal forms of disci- bor organization' . . . includes displine, such as discharge, suspension, couraging participation in concerted
and demotion, but also action ad- activities . . . such as a legitimate
versely affecting any term or condi- strike." NLRB v. ErieResistor Corp.,
tion of employment. See, e.g., Union 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963). See Am.
Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657 Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
(6th Cir. 1983); Champion PartsRe- 300, 313 (1965) ("union membership"
builders, Inc., Northeast Div. v. not to be discouraged includes particiNLRB, 717 E2d 845 (3rd Cir. 1983).
pation in protected union activities).
In most cases, this element of section
The Importance of Motive
158(a)(3) does not control the outMost importantly, the discrimina- come because specific evidence of intion prohibited by section 158(a)(3) is tent to encourage or discourage is not
a motive-based concept. It is limited an indispensable element of proof. If
to those adverse actions taken because "a natural and foreseeable conse-
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quence" of an employer's discrimination is encouragement or discouragement, it "must be presumed" that the
employer intended such consequence.
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. at 52. Since a "natural and foreseeable consequence" of "discrimination," properly understood as adverse
action taken because employees engaged in protected conduct, will normally discourage that protected conduct, most section 158(a)(3) cases turn
on a single issue: whether protected
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's adverse
action.
Burden of Proof
The Board's General Counsel bears
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in an
employer's adverse action. This proof
constitutes a prima facie case of violation. If the employer presents no evidence to rebut or if the reasons an employer proffers to explain the adverse
action are rejected as pretextual, the
prima facie case is a sufficient basis
for a violation without further inquiry. See NLRB v. Townsend & Bottum, Inc., 722 E2d 297 (6th Cir.
1983); Champion Parts Rebuilders,
Inc. Northeast Div. v. NLRB, 717
E2d 845, 853 (3d Cir. 1983).
Mixed Motive Cases
Often, however, an employer will
offer evidence of lawful motive that
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cannot be rejected as pretextual but is
insufficient to rebut the General
Counsel's proof that the employee's
protected conduct was a substantial
or motivating factor in the adverse
action. These are referred to as mixed
motive cases. The employer in these
circumstances can avoid being held in
violation of section 158(a)(3) by proving by a preponderence of the evidence, as an affirmative defense, that
the adverse action also rested on some
legitimate business justification and
that the adverse action would have
been taken independently of the employee's protected conduct. NLRB v.
Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S.
393, 401 (1983) (upholding the
Board's position advanced first in
Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083
(1980), 662 E2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S 989 (1982) and
ruling that the Code permits "placing
the burden on the employer to prove
that absent the improper motivation
he would have acted in the same
manner for wholly legitimate reasons").
Courts of appeals have ruled that
the employer's burden in mixed motive cases is to prove that on the day
the adverse action occurred, it would
have been taken irrespective of the
employee's protected conduct and
not that it could have been taken for
legitimate reasons. Presbyterian/St.
Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 723
E2d 1468, 1479 (10th Cir. 1983); Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 692
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F2d 169, 171 (lst Cir. 1982); see also
Keeler Corp. v. NLRB, 719 E2d 847
(6th Cir. 1983).
The Wright Line-Transp. Management shifting-burdens doctrine similarly controls analyses of section
158(b)(2) violations and discrimination because of employee concerted
activity arising in nonunion settings.
See Painters,Local 22 7 v. NLRB, 717
E2d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 1983) (section
158(b)(2) application); NLRB v. Valley Plaza, Inc. (CaptainNemo's), 715
E2d 237, 244 (6th Cir. 1983); Mr.
Steak, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 553 (1983)
(Wright Line analysis used to find section 158(a)(l) violation arising from
discharge or unorganized employee's
protesting working conditions).
Overt, direct evidence showing that
employee protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in the
adverse action is not a prerequisite to
proving a prima facie case under section 158(a)(3). Because such direct evidence is "a rarity at best," the Board
may make credibility resolutions and
rely on circumstantial evidence to
draw reasonable inferences whether
an adverse action was impermissibly
motivated. See NLRB v. Brookwood
Furniture,701 E2d 452, 464-65 (5th
Cir. 1983); see also NLRB v. Instrument Corp. ofAm., 714 E2d 324, 328
(4th Cir. 1983).
Proving Employer Knowledge
Indispensable to proving unlawful
motive, however, is proving the employer's knowledge that the employee
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subjected to an adverse action engaged in protected conduct. When direct evidence is unavailable, circumstantial evidence may suffice to
impute knowledge, for example,
when employees openly engage in the
protected conduct and "it strains...
credibility . . . to suppose that [employer] could have missed what was
going on under its nose." NLRB v.
Acme Die Casting Corp., 728 F2d
959, 961 (7th Cir. 1984), and when
"the smallness and openness of the
plant" makes it unlikely the protected
conduct would "remain secret."
NLRB v. Instrument Corp. of Am.,
714 E2d 324, 329 (4th Cir. 1983).
Moreover, a prima facie case requires
more than proof of knowledge, even
more than knowledge combined with
evidence of employer hostility to employees engaging in protected conduct. Id. at 328.
No exact calculus governs what additional circumstantial evidence warrants an inference of unlawful motive.
The "garden variety" section 158(a)(3)
case involves employee discipline. The
General Counsel claims that an employee has been disciplined because of
protected conduct, and the employer
contends the discipline was imposed
for inefficiency, insubordination, or
other misconduct. See, e.g., Edward
G.Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F2d
86 (3d Cir. 1943). In these cases, after
knowledge has been proved, making a
prima facie case of unlawful motive
will usually require proof of one or
more of the following:
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* Background evidence of employer

hostility to employee protected conduct;
* Employee had a good work record;
" Employee had not been a good
worker, but employer condoned employee's conduct until the advent of
employee's protected activities;
e Employer has historically condoned alleged misconduct when engaged in by other employees or disciplined others more leniently;
e Coincidence in time between discipline and employee's protected activity;
9 Implausible, discredited, or shifting reasons suggesting post hoc rationalization to clothe discriminatory
discipline in legitimacy; or
* Departure from established practice in administering discipline indicating a cover for bad motive.
In assessing motive, an employer's
coercive statements, not protected by
section 158(c), are admissible but the
Board may not admit as evidence of
motive "unrelated, non-coercive expressions of opinion on union matters." See Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, 180 E2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950),
aff'd as NLRB v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 430 U.S. 498 (1951). See also
IndianaMetal Prod. Corp. v. NLRB,
202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953);
Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B.
1074 n.7 (1967) (quoting legislative
history). Statements protected by sec-
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tion 158(c) that would ordinarily be
deemed relevant and admissible in
courts of law may be introduced,
however, to show background, motivation, or context. NLRB v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 418 F2d 736, 760 (2d Cir.
1969). See also Linn v. Plant Guard
Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 n.5 (1966)
(section 158(c) adopted to prevent
Board from attributing antiunion
motive to employer on the basis of
past statements).

B

USINESS JUSTIFICATION * In the
course of a labor dispute, an employer may react to employees having
engaged in section 157 conduct by
taking responsive actions likely to affect adversely protected employee interests but explained by business justifications. For example, an employer
in response to a lawful economic
strike may replace strikers to maintain
production or may grant superseniority to lure strikers back to work or to
attract striker replacements. Moreover,
in the face of a threatened strike or to
strengthen its bargaining position, the
employer may lock out employees. Or
in response to a strike that violates a
contractual no-strike pledge, the employer may discipline union leaders
more severely than other strikers because union officers breached a perceived duty to uphold the contract. If
the methods of proof described in the
previous section enable the General
Counsel to make a prima facie case of
an intent to interfere with employees'
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protected rights, those methods, of
course, control the legal analysis.
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strike replacements and strikers who
abandoned the strike and returned to
work. There was no evidence of subjective intent to discriminate to discourage concerted activities. The
court of appeals reversed the Board's
finding of a section 158(a)(3) violation, holding that, absent a finding of
a specific unlawful intent, a legitimate
business purpose is always a defense
to an unfair labor practice charge.
The Supreme Court, however, sustained the Board's position, first stating that clearly "[w]hen specific evidence of a subjective intent to discriminate or to encourage or discourAs the Supreme Court has recog- age union membership is shown, and
nized, however, these responsive found... [c]onduct which on its face
actions taken in the course of a labor appears to serve legitimate business
dispute may present "a possible com- ends ... is wholly impeached .... "
plex of motives" often making it "dif- Id. at 227-28. Furthermore, and more
ficult to identify the true motive." significantly, even without specific evMetropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, idence of subjective intent, a violation
460 U.S. 693, 701 (1983). Thus this may be found by reason of the "inhertype of case presents the issue whether ently discriminatory or destructive
the Board may draw inferences of un- nature of the conduct itself." Id. at
lawful motive by means other than 228. Relying on the Radio Officers'
those described in the previous sec- rationale, the Court reasoned that the
tion. The Supreme Court has wrestled employer in these cases must be held
with this question in a series of cases to intend the natural consequences
over almost a quarter century. The an- that foreseeably and inescapably flow
swer and rationale have been clear for from its actions.
some years; their full impact may
After subsequently evaluating this
only now be emerging.
issue in several cases involving lockouts, the Court further developed its
Erie Resistor rationale in NLRB v.
Specific Evidence Outweighs Business Justification
GreatDane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26
In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., (1967). The employer had refused to
373 U.S. 221 (1963), an employer had pay striking employees accrued vacaextended a 20-year seniority credit to tion benefits during a strike, while

40

THE PRACTICAL LAWYER (Vol. 33-No. 2)

MARCH

important employee rights or has a
"comparatively slight" adverse effect
on them. NLRB v. GreatDane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967).
This distinction was reaffirmed and
explicated in MetropolitanEdison Co.
v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 701 (1983)
(absent explicit contractual duty to
take affirmative steps to end unlawful
work stoppage, disparate punishment
of union officers when participating
in unlawful strike, because they fail to
take such affirmative steps, violates
section 158(a)(3) because "inherently
destructive" of protected employee interests). As the Court reasoned in
MetropolitanEdison, conduct "inherently destructive of employee interests" carries a strong inference of
impermissible motive. Hence even in
the face of employer evidence of legitimate and substantial business justification, the Board "'may nevertheless
draw an inference of improper motive
from the conduct itself. . ."' Id. at 701
(quoting GreatDane Trailers). Whether drawing this inference in these cases
is appropriate depends on the Board's
exercise of "'its duty to strike the
proper balance between the asserted
"InherentlyDestructive"
business justifications and the invaEmployer Action
Even more significantly, the Court sion of employee rights in light of the
confirmed in dicta that if the em- Act and its policy.'" Id. In contrast, if
ployer does introduce evidence of "le- the adverse effect on employees of the
gitimate and substantial business employer's conduct is "comparatively
justification," the Board may still find slight," no inference of unlawful moa violation of section 158(a)(3), de- tive from the conduct itself is permispending on whether the Board rea- sible "'if the employer has come
sonably concludes the employer's forward with evidence of legitimate
conduct is "inherently destructive" of and substantial business justifications

making payment to employees replacing strikers, nonstrikers, and strikers
who had returned to work. Disagreeing with the Board, the court of appeals found no violation. Although the
employer had presented no evidence of
legitimate motive, the Board failed affirmatively to show an unlawful motivation to discourage union membership or to interfere with the exercise of
protected rights. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "once it has
been proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct,
which could have adversely affected
employee rights to some extent, the
burden is on the employer to establish
that he was motivated by legitimate
objectives since proof of motivation is
most accessible to him." Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). Since the General
Counsel had proved that the employer's conduct carried the potential of
adverse effect upon employee rights
and the employer "simply did not
meet the burden of proof" of a proper
motive, the Board properly found a
violation of section 158(a)(3).
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Definitions aside, focusing on the
for the conduct.'" Id. (emphasis in the
original). Then, no violation may be Supreme Court's reference in Metrofound unless, through the methodol- politan Edison to the Board's "duty"
ogy discussed in the previous section, to strike a "proper balance" between
the General Counsel proves by a pre- business necessity and coercive effects
ponderance of the evidence that the on employee rights "in light of the Act
employer's conduct was unlawfully and its policy" may be the most realismotivated.
tic guide. Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
As the Erie Resistor-Great Dane- NLBB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983). So
Metropolitan Edison analysis clearly viewed, section 158(a)(3) analysis, in
suggests, the definition of "inherently some circumstances, enjoys a remarkdestructive" conduct can be critical. able similarity to section 158(a)(1)
The only guidance offered by the Su- analysis. But see Huck Mfg. Co. v.
preme Court is that conduct is "inher- NLRB, 693FE2d 1176, 1183-84&n.ll
ently destructive" if it carries with it (5th Cir. 1982) (sections 158(a)(1) and
'unavoidable consequences which the
158(a)(3) differ: The former requires
employer not only foresaw but which balancing of employer business neceshe must have intended' and thus bears sity and employee rights and the latter
'its own indices of intent.'" NLRB v. a showing of unlawful motive or "inGreatDane Trailers,Inc., 388 U.S. 26, herently destructive" conduct).
33 (1967) (quoting ErieResistor). Formulated at such a high level of abstraction, this is not very helpful. Two Superseniority of Union Officers
Cases involving superseniority for
other articulations, widely used, are
union officers provide a useful insight
more helpful:
into the operation of the "inherently
* Conduct "'with far-reaching effects destructive" rule as a policy-making
which would hinder future bargain- device. After almost a decade of uning, or conduct which discriminated
certainty, in Gulton Electro- Voice,
solely on the basis of participating in
Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 406, 409 (1983),
strikes or union activities.'" NLRB v. enforced sub nom. IUE, Local 900 v.
Sherwin Williams Co., 714 F2d 1095,
NLRB, 727 E2d 1184 (D.C. Cir.
1101 (11 th Cir. 1983) (adopting stan1984), the Board held that collective
dard and citing approval in other cirbargaining
agreements granting sucuits); or
perseniority to union officers pre* Conduct that "creates 'visible and sumptively violate sections 158(a)(3)
continuing obstacles' to the future ex- and 158(b)(2) of the Code unless limiercise of employee rights." NLRB v. ted to:
Kaiser Steel Corp., 700 E2d 575, 577
9 Layoff and recall; and
(9th Cir. 1983).

42

THE PRACTICAL LAWYER (Vol. 33-No. 2)

0 "Employees who, as agents of the
union, must be on the job to accomplish their duties directly related to administering the collective-bargaining
agreement." Id. at 266 N.L.R.B. 409.

No proof of subjective intent to
discriminate to encourage or discourage union membership was proffered
or required because all superseniority
arrangements were seen as "inherently
discriminatory" and "at odds with
[section 157] of the Act." Id. at 408.
The Board's labeling all superseniority as inherently "at odds" with employee protected interests was critical.
More instructive, however, was the
decision to allow some "inherently
discriminatory" conduct, "[i]n consideration of the underlying purpose of
the Act," while disallowing other superseniority arrangements.
The Board had stated in an earlier
case that "the issue is ultimately one of

justification." Dairylea Coop., Inc.,
219 N.L.R.B. 656, 658 (1975), enforced sub non. NLRB v. Milk Drivers
& Dairy Employees Local 338, 531
E2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976). But "justification," of course, is a question of
policy as Justice Holmes early recog-

nized. Vegelahn v. Guntner 167 Mass.
92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) (dissenting
opinion). See IUE, Local 900 v.
NLRB, 727 E2d 1184,1189 (D.C.Cir.
1984) (Board's superseniority rule ultimately turns on "question of policy."); see also UAW Local 1384 v.
NLRB, 756 E2d 482 (7th Cir. 1985)
(reviewing and collecting cases). Accordingly, the Erie Resistor-Great
Dane Trailers-Metropolitan Edison
doctrine, refined over several decades
of litigation, stands as a potent tool
for shaping the contours of labor policy.
(To be continued)

Employer participation in efforts to repudiate a currently recognized
or certified union raise important free speech issues. The issue is described well by the court in Texaco v. NLRB, 722 E2d 1226, 1231 (5th
Cir. 1984):
The employer must maintain complete neutrality of action, as contrasted with expression of views, in regard to its employees' decision to
become or remain unionized. Thus, an employer may not act by way
of preference, but may voice preference for a particular union or its
preference that the employees remain non-union .

. .

. Further, it is

equally clear that an employer may furnish information upon request
.... (emphasis in original)
- F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 87
(ALI-ABA, Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1986).

